

GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS OF SUPER POWERS; INDO-PAK ANIMOSITIES: REVISITED

Abstract

This research paper attempts to review the geo-political role, geo-strategic interests and intervention of the super powers in the South Asian politics; especially in Indo-Pak mutual animosities. Regionally, the both India and Pakistan have experienced bitter relations which have been exploited by interference of super powers in order to expand their political ideologies and interests, particularly, in cold war era. Moreover, it will also determine those factors which worked as an impetus behind the motives and intentions of super powers in different regional political dimensions and in changing socio-political realities which impelled super powers to formulate regional policies based on geo-political and geo-strategic dimensions. The security issues between Pakistan and India, particularly, during the cold war era as well as hot wars; from 1948, 1965 and 1971 have also been analyzed. Further, it will encapsulate those facts; regarding the basic reasons behind existing hostilities between India and Pakistan. Pakistan's participation in West sponsored security arrangements, American military assistance to Pakistan and the neutrality of the Soviet Union on Kashmir issue will also be summarized. Therefore, the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan; U.S. fear of Russian ideological expansions towards South Asia, emerging political challenges resulted from China's tilt towards Pakistan, particularly, in Pak-India security syndromes, and threats of hot wars to jeopardize the interests of super powers will also be revisited.

Keywords: Geo-strategic, Geo-political, Super Powers, Interests, Pak-India, Animosity, Cold War, Expansion, Hot War, South Asia.

Geo-strategic and Geo-political Interests of Super powers in South Asia

After the partition of India, the emergence of India and Pakistan as newly born states on the map of the world impelled super powers to forge their regional, political, ideological, security concerns and economic interests in South Asia. In fact, during cold war era, the conflicting ideological clashes of super powers and changing geo-political realities contributed to realize that India and Pakistan are important countries to associate them ideologically and politically, however, mutual hostilities, security concerns and lack of defensive capabilities urged Pakistan and India to make choices of their political associations and strategic allies.¹ In these circumstances, conflicting global politics, geo-strategic location and changing geo-political scenario brought superpowers to take deep interests in India Pakistan mutual relations and to expand their personal political designs in order to safeguard regional interests in economic as well as political fields. Furthermore, the border conflicts, un-resolved territorial disputes and fear of expansion of communism in South Asia brought U.S. and Russia to play active

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and significant political role in Indo-Pak conflicting relations. Since their inception, security threats, regional conflicts and the occurrence of hot wars required the role of super powers, to expand their ideological interests and to form alliances with India or Pakistan, to protect their geo-strategic and geo-political objectives and interests, particularly, in South Asia.² The hate and fear relationship were existed between both countries since the dying days of the British Raj in India. Thus, the basic reason which was underlying; Indo-Pak hostilities can be found in their historical experiences, regional conflicts and clash of political interests in regional politics as well as global politics. In fact, Pakistan and India have been in a state of perpetual cold war, vacillated mutual ties and constant fear of security threats.³ This cold war was evolved from the unresolved territorial disputes like Kashmir, Gurdaspur and Hyderabad Deccan resulted from unfair decisions of Radcliffe Award during partition of Sub-continent in 1947.⁴ Besides this, the water distribution issues, dispute over borders, India conquest of the princely state of Junagadh in 1947 led towards the happening of 1965 War. Later on, the second War occurred in 1971 and resulted separation of East Pakistan was major regional conflicts; which demanded the serious attentions of super powers in South Asian politics.⁵ These were the underlying factors between the India and Pakistan which increased the tempo of the cold war and transformed it into few hot wars. In these changing global political apparatus, the super power interests, role and contributions remained profound, effective and interest oriented which shaped the events, political alliances and promoted their regional political agendas. These motives of the super powers and their major allies made it difficult to give due recognition to the role of other political actors in the global politics. The politics of the subcontinent is characterized by several discontinuities, intra-regional conflicts based on discrepancies in ideology, national objectives, territorial disputes and political rivalries.⁶ Keeping in view these geo-strategic consequences, the super powers also maintained direct and indirect interests in the South Asian region and its politics.

However, the regional cold war was not conducted in a vacuum. On the other hand, the global politics as well as the geo-strategic location of the both countries; Pakistan and India brought about the involvement of the super powers. These motives and changing regional political environment required the participation of Soviet Union, China and United States in the regional political apathy of South Asia.⁷ Therefore, the Soviet- American, the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-American rivalries; shaped the political scenario, influenced on the foreign policy formulation and compelled the India and Pakistan to make their choices for political, ideological and security alliances. However, all these political developments, geo-strategic objectives and military assistance were emerged out; from the larger interests in international race, scientific competition and political domination. In this game, South Asia became merely another chessboard on which pawns could be moved on one way or another. The super power's interests and related moves were further complicated by Indo-Pakistan relations and often made the regional cold war very bitter, unsteady, intense and severe.⁸

Indo-Pak Conflicting Bilateral Ties: Ideological Clashes and Superpowers

Since the independence of India and Pakistan, these two states became important political actors in regional politics, in ideological clashes in cold war era and their mutual concerns about; security, defence, regional balance of power and to maintain strategic objectives as well as its survival and existence.⁹ At that time, the U.S. like the U.S.S.R. was pre-occupied with more urgent problems in Europe and the Far East. However, political realities changed because of developing cold war and expansion of ideological philosophies; capitalism and communism. In that era, Washington turned its attention towards South Asia which seemed as an ideal region for the implementation of new U.S. policies. Friendly gestures of good will and modest amounts of economic aid were first contemplated without any major political and military involvement. Between India and Pakistan, the former got greater attention from Washington, because of its size, popularity of its leaders, like Nehru, who was quite well known in the Western world and was emerging as the leader of Afro-Asian countries. However, the United State started to formulate its new policy towards the Middle East and gave serious thought to regional defense arrangement for the Middle East as well as South Asia; Pakistan's geographical location gave it a special strategic importance.¹⁰ West Pakistan bordered on the region surrounding the Persian Gulf and East Pakistan could become as outlet to the countries of Southeast Asia. From these strategic locations, the United States could deal with the problem of international communism from a "Position of strength."¹¹

In Pakistan, the atmosphere was quite different and of course favourable to the U.S. Pakistan, in her quest for security in the face of unending Indo-Pakistan tensions, was eager to find an ally. The plans for regional pacts which the U.S. was ready to sponsor had great attraction for Pakistan.¹² The United States was happy to get the support of an Asian country, with its significant geo-political location, at a time, when Non-Alignment was on the dominating theme among the Asian countries and Gandhi was its ardent supporter and promoter. On the other hand, Pakistan was delighted to get the help of a super power to increase her military strength to meet the threats of aggression from India. The unfavorable geo-strategic environment and the security concerns developed in the early years of independence shaped Pakistan's world view. It was characterized by a deep sense of insecurity inspired by external threats to its independent existence. The major goal of Pakistan's defense policy has, therefore, been the search for security, strategic deterrence and territorial integrity of the state. These security concerns practically indicated two factors; firstly, the augmentation of security of Pakistan against 'threats' primarily from India and secondarily from Afghanistan because of U.S.S.R. designs of ideological expansion, territorial occupation and her dream to reach the warm water. Secondly, the offsetting of India's military superiority in South Asia by strengthening Pakistan's defense arrangements and, at times, by using diplomacy as a countervailing measure.¹³ Pakistan security concerns since independence have been dominated by its demands for territorial integrity from India and consequent military anxieties. Pakistan made a variety of coalition arrangements with extra-regional political actors over the years- through SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955, bilateral security arrangements with US and also ushered the era of time tested, deeper and closest relationship with the People's

Republic of China since the 1960.¹⁴ These geo-strategic interests and active participation of Pakistan proved useful, productive and constructive to equip its military with reasonable armory, strategic deterrence and to counterfeit the looming security threats from India. This Pakistan and U.S. strategic relationship and common geo-political interests, however, did not provide any long term gain vis-à-vis India. On the other hand, super powers kept the momentum of blame game to accuse each other to exploit regional politics, existing tensions and mutual bitter ties between India and Pakistan.

An analysis of the Soviet's policy and actions towards the subcontinent will, however, show that the Russians, more than any other power, sought to utilize the tensions between India and Pakistan in achieving their political objectives in South Asia. India's struggle for power and the Muslim demand for a separate state based on religion was denounced and condemned by Russia "as a set of new imperialist devices to retain British political, economic and strategic influence in South Asia."¹⁵ At political fronts, India and the Soviet Union supported each other's position. With respect to the Russian atrocities in Hungary, India was not at all vocal as compared to her severe condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli action in Egypt. India was the only non-communist country which voted with the Soviet bloc against a U.N. resolution calling for free elections in Hungary, India's support for the U.S.S.R. was compensated by Soviet support of India's position on the Kashmir issue.

Throughout the Stalin era, Russian comments on India and Pakistan were harsh and their attitude remained hostile. Through that early period, Soviet Russia showed no inclination to establish friendly relations with India or Pakistan. But, Pandit Nehru, being a great admirer of the social welfare and economic development policies of Russia, had felt the necessity of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, a neighbour, with whom, he said, "we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do."¹⁶ Stalin like John Foster Dulles did not appreciate Nehru's Non-Alignment political strategy because he saw the world as sharply divided into two camps and thought there was no room for the middle-of-the-roaders. Nehru's first trip to the United States in 1949, at the invitation of President Truman, had drawn further Soviet criticism, and most of his speeches brought harsh comments from the Soviet press. He was called an "American Stooge."¹⁷ The Soviet Union, by sensing Pakistan's discomfort with the Western power's wooing of Nehru, tried to take advantage of Pakistan's frustration. An invitation to visit Russia was sent to Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1949.¹⁸ At that stage, Pakistan could not be influenced by the Soviet Union, because it desperately needed economic and military assistance, neither of which the Soviet Union was in a position to supply. Thus, Pakistan turned down Stalin's invitation and became more friendly with the United States in the mid-1950s. The Kremlin leaders recognized that the best way to penalize Pakistan was to support her adversary, India.¹⁹

The period from 1949 to 1959 was an era of friendship and cooperation between the two large countries of Asia: India and China.²⁰ India was the second non-communist country after Burma to recognize the People's Republic of China. After the exchange of ambassadors, relations between the two improved a great deal. On the other hand, China's relation with Pakistan were not as warm, one

reason being that Pakistan had shown no special enthusiasm about the new China. Though, the two countries were not close to each other, there was not any hostility between them, either. Diplomatic missions had been exchanged and other links were established.²¹ When Indo-Pakistan trade came to a complete stop in 1949, Pakistan in its search for new markets sold jute and cotton to China in return for coal under a barter agreement. China on its part, hoped to cultivate relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East through Pakistan.²² The real incentive in this regard came when the West was confronted with the Korean War. Southeast Asia and the Middle East became strategically and economically important areas, which needed to be defended from the “threats of aggression” from communists. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under the Eisenhower Administration, set out on a fact-finding mission to countries of the Middle East and South Asia on May 9, 1953, during which he visited India and Pakistan. Dulles talk with Nehru were unsuccessful, Indian Prime Minister had fundamental difference on the issue of regional military pacts, and like most Asian and Arab countries, were not convinced of “any imminent communist threat.” Secondly, Nehru was not prepared to give up his policy of Non-Alignment which had earned for his country high prestige and a favourable image in the Third World.²³

During the Korean War, India played her first major role in international affairs and her policy was found favourable to Russia. Nehru’s speeches and statements gave the impression that India agreed more with the Soviet Union than with the United States on matters related to the Korean War. On another occasion, when the Japanese peace Treaty became a controversial matter India sided with the Soviet bloc. Nehru’s open criticism of the policies of the west began to gain Stalin’s appreciation. However, relations between India and the U.S.S.R. showed some improvements; simultaneously, this was the end of Moscow’s softer policy towards Pakistan.

Pakistan became a member of SEATO in 1954 and later on joined the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) in 1955 after entering into a bilateral military agreement with the U.S. in 1954 and subsequently and additional one in 1959.²⁴ India reacted aggressively to the U.S. decision to include Pakistan in her global political strategy; thus, Indo-U.S. relations were put to severe strains and stresses in the mid-1950s. Pakistan relied heavily on Western sources of supply of military and economic assistance especially from the US and Great Britain. Later, it diversified its sources of supply by purchasing defense equipment from France, West Germany and from arms market in Europe. The desire to enhance Pakistan’s security was one of the major reasons that Pakistan joined the West-sponsored security arrangements in 1954-55.²⁵ Pakistan and the US signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty in May 1954. Under this treaty, the US agreed to provide military equipment and training to Pakistani armed forces. This was followed by the establishment of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Besides Pakistan, this organization included Thailand, the Philippines, USA, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand. One year later Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact.²⁶

Pakistan and the US were operating from two different perspectives. For the US the underlying considerations were global; for Pakistan regional consideration was important. For the US, the major concern was the containment

of the Soviet Union and China; for Pakistan India was the major adversary. The US was obsessed with communism and it wanted to contain impact on Asian countries. Pakistan wanted to offset India's military superiority by obtaining military and economic assistance from the West.²⁷ Pakistan obtained over \$900 million worth of military equipment under the Mutual Defense Agreement, the SEATO and CENTO.²⁸ This included tanks and other small arms and transportation equipment, aircraft including F-104, B-57, G-86, and C-130 aircraft equipment for the navy, radar and other communication equipment. An American advisory mission was set up in Pakistan to help Pakistani senior commanders in their endeavors to modernize the armed forces and to improve their overall disposition and efficiency. The US-Pakistan cooperation during the 1950s and the early 1960s proved very useful for making up considerable deficiencies in the security arrangements of Pakistan. It accelerated the modernization process and enabled the air force and the navy to improve its efficiency, defensive capability and acquired valuable experience by participation in CENTO's joint exercises. Though the overall balance of power in South Asia still remained in favour of India, these security pacts gave Pakistan the much needed confidence that it could now withstand India's military and diplomatic pressures.²⁹ The American aid also strengthened the position of the military in the domestic political system as it had, in addition to have substantial domestic resources at its disposal got external aid which made it the most modernized segment of society and characterized by cohesion, hierarchy, discipline, and esprit de corps. The US was also benefited from this bilateral relationship with Pakistan. The Americans obtained the support of the second largest non-communist Asian state. Moreover, the US also enjoyed communication, intelligence sharing facilities, and related services in Pakistan. This mutual cooperation was useful for American's global strategy against the Soviet Union.³⁰

After Pakistan's participation in the West-sponsored security arrangements, American military experts were based in Pakistan to provide necessary training and technical advices to Pakistani officers. Since the late 1960s, Pakistani military personnel were also sent to France and China for training.³¹ Nehru's condemnation on the Western military pacts in the Third World brought praises from the Soviet press, and Stalin's successors valued his independent foreign policy to protect American global political interests and to promote its geo-strategic policy of regional exploitation and to ally India or Pakistan. They tilted towards the Indian government and took advantage of the tensions between India and Pakistan. They saw that antipathy to Pakistan was the pivot of India's foreign policy postures, however, this inclination of U.S. raised eye-brows in Pakistan foreign policy contour.³² Meanwhile, China's relations with Pakistan remained cool and smooth, keeping in view; the changing political environment and hegemonic designs of super powers to form regional alliances for their geo-political and geo-strategic interests. Pakistan's entry into SEATO was regretted by China but it was not made a special propaganda issue by the Chinese leaders, who showed considerable restraint in dealing with Pakistan at the height of its association with the West.³³

During 1954-1962, the Soviet Union dropped its neutrality on the Kashmir issue and openly supported India. It not only gave unequivocal support to

India on the matter, but also went to the extent of exercising its veto power when the U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Kashmir were displeasing to India. However, new U.S. policy towards the sub-continent in the 1961 was launched after the arrival of Kennedy administration. The keynote of the new policy was favourable to neutralists like India, but it worked to the disadvantage of allies like Pakistan.³⁴ However, Indo-U.S. relations improved because of the growing tensions between India and China during 1959-60. In fact, President Kennedy wanted to exploit the Sino-Indian conflicting ties for U.S. to gain political advantages. Besides this, various geo-political and geo-strategic factors like the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict and prospects for East-West détente also influenced alignment and non-alignment in the policies of India and Pakistan. The most important factor which was affecting U.S. policy towards the sub-continent; particularly, related to common objectives of both the U.S.S.R. and U.S. was concerning China in the 1960s and the role that India was expected to play in their global policy for the containment of China. For the containment of China in the region, the U.S.S.R, between 1957 and 1961, extended credit to India totaling \$670 million.³⁵ At the same time, India obtained large amounts of economic assistance from both the United States and other Western countries. The whole decade of 1950 to 1960 and onwards was remarkable in Indo-Soviet relationships because of some commonality which both countries enjoyed in the context of geo-political objectives. Moscow and New Delhi entered into numerous trade agreements from 1953 to 1959 which not only improved their relationship, but also enhanced the economic development of India. Soviet Russia helped India in construction and development of heavy industry in various parts of the country.

On the other hand, the period from 1950 to 1960, was extremely of intimate relationship in Sino-Indian relations. In South Asia, some geo-political complications arose during that period, but those were solved with a spirit of good will and friendship. The first major complication factor in their relations arose over Tibet, whose international status was somewhat ambivalent. China viewed Tibet as part of its own territory, sought to end its autonomy and integrated it with the rest of the country by force. India was dismayed by China's use of force in Tibet but lacked the military strength to challenge China. Nehru could have opposed China by accepting military support from the western powers, however, at that time, he was also interested in establishing his policy of non-alignment. However, Sino-Indian relations survived Tibet and the dispute was solved by their signing the Tibet Agreement on April 24, 1954, on the basis of "panch sheel" five principles of peaceful co-existence.³⁶ Moreover, India vigorously championed the cause of China during the Korean War. Meanwhile, the most popular slogan which was being floated throughout the India; *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai* means Indians and Chinese are brothers. Leaders of both countries exchanged visits and received enthusiastic welcome from the people of the host country. India and China worked together in the political spheres. India and several other countries sponsored the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 at Bandung where Chou-en-Lai demonstrated his diplomatic skills and statesmanship in dealing with a large number of Asian and African countries. Towards the end of the 1950s Sino-Indian friendship experienced strain. Chinese maps included the territory in the Himalayas which India claimed as its own.³⁷

The boundary pact between China and Pakistan was the first major step in the Sino-Pakistan friendship which has grown steadily for the last fifteen years. In 1959, President Ayub had already shown his willingness to approach China for a peaceful settlement of the Boundary between the two countries. The ceasefire line provided stability of defence of the areas; contiguous to China's province of Sinkiang from the Karakoram pass in the northeast to the farthest point in the northwest. The border region comprises of two distinct areas, Baltistan and Hunza, and in this region was comprised on one of the greatest mountain complexes, the Karakorum range of high mountains, deep valleys and turbulent rivers.³⁸ No boundary line had ever been shown in the sector west of the Karakorum pass on any Pakistani map. Unlike the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, China refused to regard Kashmir as "an integral part of India."³⁹ In 1960 during the meetings of the Chinese and Indian officials, regarding boundary demarcations when the Indians tried to include in the talks the border between Pakistan and Indian-held Kashmir, China refused to discuss this part of the boundary. However, Pakistan reacted to China's decision and sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Government; suggesting a boundary agreement between the two countries. The 1960s brought the mistrust and suspicion in Sino-Indian relations to the surface and the golden era of their friendship came to an end.⁴⁰ Their relations deteriorated in 1959 when incident occurred along their Himalayan borders; one in the North East Frontier Agency (NAFA) and the other in the Ladakh area of Northeast Kashmir. Other factors, which produced a drift between these two countries, included President Kennedy's new policy towards South Asia, which regarded India as a counter-part to China. During this era, relationship between China and India experienced turmoil and it widened the gulf between these two countries. Meanwhile, Pakistan and China turned towards each other because of their mutual geo-strategic interests, common geo-political objectives and rapidly changing foreign policy contours of super powers in South Asia.

Disheartened by the unfortunate event of the subcontinent, particularly Indian wars with Pakistan and China, the United States was convinced that there was no hope of building up India against China in Asian affairs. In the case of Pakistan, the special relations were formally broken when Pakistan gave notice to close the important U.S strategic communication Centre at Bedaber near Peshawar from where the U-2 plane had once taken off and was shot down in Russia.⁴¹ During the Johnson administration, the United States began a process of disengagement from military commitments in the subcontinent. President Johnson wanted to make it clear to both India and Pakistan that the U.S. military assistance to them was not meant for their fighting against each other. The changed attitude of the United States was mostly because of her military venture in Vietnam. So, this involvement of America in Southeast Asia became a top priority area. At the same time, the United States paid attention to the Middle East, where the Soviet Union was rapidly expanding her influence by taking advantage of the regional conflicts between the Arabs and Israel.⁴² President Kennedy enunciated a "new alliance for progress" in lieu of military alliances for the developing countries, emphasizing on economic aid. India was delighted with this paradigm shift in U.S. policy, whereas, Pakistan was worried. Kennedy seemed to make extraordinary efforts to maintain good relations; with India and Pakistan simultaneously. But the task was not easy; rather, it was difficult and complex like having good relations at

the same time with the Arab countries and Israel. Both Ayub and Nehru were invited to the United States in 1961. As a result of Kennedy's meetings with the leaders of India and Pakistan, the U.S. was successful in maintaining a policy of equal treatment with both Pakistan and India. India satisfied with this move, had new hopes and was optimistic.⁴³

Three major developments in this period made the defense planners to review their defense strategies. These were the supply of arms to India after the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and the war on the Bangladesh question between India and Pakistan in November-December 1971. The situation changed when the Indo-China armed conflict started in October 1962. However, the hostile attitude then prevailed towards China, the Western countries reacted in favour of India, which was supposed to be the victim of "naked aggression" by China. This was the most appropriate moment for the United States, which showed its great favour by rushing arms and ammunitions supplies to India. This military assistance of U.S to India even continued after China's unilateral declaration of a ceasefire. India embarked upon a huge military build-up at Chinese borders with the military supplies not only from the United States but from the Soviet Union as well. The Indo-Chinese conflict not only brought India closer to the United States but also the Sino-Soviet rift was further expanded as a result of the Soviet support to India. So, the policy of strengthening India's military strength suited the objectives of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia.⁴⁴

After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Soviet Russia reassessed "new trends" in Pakistan's policy. Pakistan had shown its displeasure with the American decision to supply arms to India. Along with that, the Soviet Union also watched with concern Pakistan's growing friendship and closer links with China with the twin objectives to exploit Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the United States and to prevent the growing relationship between China and Pakistan. Keeping in view these geo-political tactics in South Asia, the Soviet Union began a new phase of its policy towards this region. The new policy continued the special relationship with India but attempts were now made to cultivate better relationships with Pakistan. As a result of Russia's new policy, a series of dialogues began on ambassadorial and then higher official levels with Pakistan.⁴⁵ During these dialogues, it was clear that the Soviet Union wanted to discuss secondary issues like a cultural agreement and trade, whereas, Pakistan was eager to discuss the more important issues, such as Soviet support of India on Kashmir, Afghanistan's stand of "Pakhtoonistan" and Soviet arms to India which were causing great anxieties in Pakistan.⁴⁶ The Sino-Indian war put an end to the "two thousand years of friendship" and had a great impact on the South Asian triangle.⁴⁷ It brought China's differences with Soviet Union to the surface. Disappointed with the Union States attitude, Pakistan started its policy of bilateralism which not only resulted in closer links with China, but also normalized its relations with the U.S.S.R. Another repercussion of the Sino-Indian war was the strengthening of India against Pakistan. After the death of Nehru, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri brought some changes in his foreign policy as well as consolidated its position on Kashmir issue and modernized its armed forces.

On the other hand, the 1960s brought Pakistan and China closer to each other; with completely divergent social, economic, and political orders. India considered these new Chinese diplomatic moves towards Pakistan as antipathy to India. China claimed to base its relationship with Pakistan in the 1960s on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which guided its relation with India in the 1950s; while Pakistan's interpretation was referred as mutual national interests.⁴⁸ As pointed out earlier, Pakistan in its quest for security turned towards new friends and new allies in the changing geo-political realities. In the 1960s, including all major powers, China seemed more sympathetic to Pakistan's anxiety over India, and this provided the big incentive to Pakistan's inclination towards Peking. On Pakistan's initiative, both countries agreed to have talks on the matter regarding the demarcation of the boundaries. For this purpose, bilateral negotiations started in September 1962, between the foreign ministers and the boundary agreement was finally signed on March 2, 1963.⁴⁹ According to the agreement, China actually ceded some 750 square miles of territory. In doing so, China's main objective was to demonstrate its willingness to settle the boundaries in a peaceful manner with its neighbours; Afghanistan, Burma, Mongolia, and Nepal. This was a source of embarrassment as well as annoyance to New Delhi.⁵⁰

As for as its international implications were concerned, this Sino-Pak boundary agreement had worsened the Indo-Pak relations. In Washington, the agreement was resented not so much because of the actual line of demarcation of its contents but for the new trends in Pakistan's foreign policy which were being tilted towards Peking. Pakistan's foreign policy began to move further to the pleasure of Johnson administration in Washington which raised eye brows in New Delhi, and created uneasiness in Moscow. A series of agreement between China and Pakistan followed the signing of the border agreement. More significant, however, were the political, diplomatic, and military cooperation and dialogues. Between 1963 and 1966, there were a number of exchange visits between top Chinese and Pakistani leaders culminating in Ayub's state visit in March 1965. There was a wide range of discussions in a much more relaxed and friendlier atmosphere than what Ayub had in Moscow in April 1965. Mao and other Chinese leaders assured Pakistan of China's full diplomatic, economic and military support.⁵¹

President Ayub's visited the U.S.S.R. in April 1965, Moscow appeared to press Pakistan to withdraw from the Western sponsored pacts, particularly CENTO and to close the US communication Centre at Bedaber base. However, Pakistan urged Moscow to modify the Soviet stand on Kashmir and to show flexibility in their stance regarding India. Neither side showed any flexibility in their respective positions, however, keeping aside these important political issues, Pakistan had already signed a civil aviation agreement in 1963, and a barter trade agreement in 1963, and a cultural agreement in June 1964. Since Ayub's first state visit to the U.S.S.R, the Soviet Pakistan relationship had been relaxed considerably though no major step was taken by either side on important political issues affecting the relationship. The Soviet Union began to maintain a posture of neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan dispute. It, however, did not take any positive step in that direction which would seriously jeopardize Russia's relations with India. This softness in its attitude was shown only to weaken Pakistan's old ties with the

United States and those emerging with China. That was how the Soviet Union maintained a face of neutrality in Indo-Pakistan affairs.⁵² Regardless of any motive behind Soviet policy towards Pakistan it was able to bring paradigm shift in Pakistan foreign policy. Its first success was seen in 1965, when the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965, Ayub, despite the warnings of Pakistan's ally China, accepted the Soviet role of mediation at the Tashkent Conference in 1966. This conference could achieve very little, if anything at all, to was a great diplomatic achievement of Soviet Russia as it played, for the first time, the role of a peacemaker in a major conflict in an Asian affairs. The 1965 war, the military balance of power was changing fast to the detrimental of Pakistan and conducive for India because the United States, on which Pakistan depended totally for military supplies, put an embargo on military supplies for both India and Pakistan. The U.S. embargo did not hit India as hard as it did Pakistan, because the Soviet Union continued to give massive military aid to India. Pakistan got military supplies from China, but there were no comparison for the Russian weapons which were being poured to India. Hence, Pakistan also tried to get Soviet arms, of which it received a modest amount after agreeing to close down the U.S. communication Centre at Bedaber near Peshawar.⁵³

In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, China gave open and unequivocal support to Pakistan. From 16th September till 22, China issued an ultimatum to India and the Chinese troops began to move along the Sikkim border, when Pakistan accepted the ceasefire resolution, the world remained suspicious by the crucial question of whether the war would escalate into a wider, longer and graver conflict between India, China and Pakistan with the potential involvement of the two superpowers directly or indirectly.⁵⁴ The Indian reaction on Soviet's decision to supply arms to Pakistan was predictable. However, Kosygin's visit to New Delhi, after visiting Pakistan, convinced Mrs. Indira Gandhi that the arms sales to Pakistan neither harmed India's vital national interests nor it was a move to counter balance India's ties with Moscow.⁵⁵ At the same time, the pressure both from the U.S and the U.S.S.R increased which compelled President Ayub to accept the ceasefire. The Chinese leaders also showed their statesmanship and understood of Pakistan's difficulties during the days of 1965 war with India. Chinese were quite ready to send its military for Pakistan's rescue and agreed to provide any assistance which Pakistan was needed at that time. While the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's difficulties and seemed to recognize that Pakistan had no option but to accept the ceasefire, they were certainly not happy to see the role of the Soviet Union as peacemaker in South Asia at the Tashkent Conference in 1966. When Liu Shao-Chi came to Pakistan in March 1966, Ayub had to make great efforts to reassure the Chinese leaders about the Tashkent Declaration.⁵⁶

After the war of 1965, Ayub looked towards China for immediate help in a rapidly deteriorating situation for Pakistan's security and defence problems. China assured Pakistan of all types of help in the case of another war with India. In the meantime, China began to give Pakistan the much-needed military supplies. Pakistan received substantial military aid after 1965; in fact, China proved to be the principal arms supplier to Pakistan in the year 1965-70.⁵⁷ Pakistan's moved to the direction of the Soviet Union during President Ayub's visit to Moscow in 1967 and Kosygin's visit to Pakistan in early 1968, culminating in the Russian decision

to give Pakistan some military supplies, raised suspicions in Peking. However, President Ayub was also disturbed by the news of the internal upheavals which were caused by the Cultural Revolution in China. Ayub probably thought that a change of leadership in China might affect his country's special links with it. China's relation with Pakistan, however, remained unchanged during the Cultural Revolution. There was apparently no sign of a crack in China's attitude towards Pakistan. But, before the fall of Ayub in 1969, China seemed to have some "second thought" on Pakistan. Pakistan saw that the Russian motives behind these schemes of regional cooperation against "imperialist" aggression and "neocolonialism" were to contain Chinese influence in the area, and also to jeopardize its friendship with China on whom it relied heavily in case of a threat from India. Accordingly, it rejected these various Russian arms, uncertain in quantity and poor in quality. Pakistan rejection of the new Soviet proposals in Asia against China put an end to the short-lived period of so-called friendly relations between Moscow and Islamabad (1965-70).⁵⁸

Richard Nixon became the President of the United States in January 1969, meanwhile, U.S policy towards the Sub-continent had undergone various changes since the days of his vice presidency in the mid-1950s. Though, President Nixon, due to the geo-political importance of the Sub-continent, could not altogether ignore it while evolving the new U.S. foreign policy. Nixon certainly decided to operate it with a low profile. Nixon was rather anxious to develop better understanding and détente with the two communist major powers; the U.S.S.R. and China. A significant development in U.S. policy with regard to the sub-continent took place when an unexpected assignment was given to Yahya Khan by Nixon to act as a middleman between Washington and Peking in the context of Nixon's new China policy. Yahya did this job with utmost secrecy and responsibility and his services were greatly appreciated by both countries. Nixon's new China policy gave Pakistan a good opportunity (which at that time was involved in the Bangladesh crisis) of renewing better relations with the United States, particularly with a sympathetic President at the White House. The better relationship was dramatized by the U.S. government's decision to lift the embargo on U.S. military equipment to both India and Pakistan, which had been banned since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. No doubt, Pakistan was pleased with this decision. It had been the main loser from the U.S. embargo since India continued to get massive military supplies from the Soviet Union, thereby causing a grave threat to Pakistan's security. During the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, Indo-U.S. relations were correct but did not remain entirely cordial. India was suspicious of Nixon's personal inclinations towards Pakistan.⁵⁹ Nixon's policy towards the sub-continent in 1971-72 raised many angry voices both inside and outside the United States. The world press had flashed atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and the Nixon administration was charged with siding with the military junta in Pakistan. A closer analysis of U.S. role during the crisis in Bangladesh revealed that President Nixon did not condone the atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and he did not approve of India's grand and well planned strategy to dismember Pakistan with Russia's diplomatic and military assistance. President Nixon tried to encourage a political settlement between the East and West wings of Pakistan, but he did not succeed. As regard to India's role, the Nixon administration branded India "as an aggressor in the war."⁶⁰

After the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan was desperate to preserve her territorial integrity in the contest of separatist tendencies in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, which appeared to have the Soviet Union's blessings. Pakistan looked towards Washington for protection from Russian designs and Indians involvement to threaten Pakistan's territorial integrity. In fact, it had already revived its interest in CENTO a reversal of Bhutto's earlier demands of withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. This was the background of the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan at the beginning of the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971.⁶¹

After becoming President, Mr. Bhutto visited Moscow in 1972, but the relationship did not get any improvement. The political unrest in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces was greatly because of Soviet encouragement. The seizure of Soviet arms smuggled into Pakistan through the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, the coup in Afghanistan and President Daud's threats to revive the sold issue of "Pakhtoonistan" were interpreted in Pakistan as indications of continued Soviet pressure to bring Pakistan into the Asian Collective Security System. In these geo-political and geo-strategic changing scenarios, Russia, the then super power continued its strategic policy to achieve its hegemonic designs while allying the regional countries like Pakistan under its political objectives and interests. However, by refusing to comply with the crude Russian pressure, Pakistan had to pay a heavy price. During this era, Soviet Russia's relation with India grew stronger day by day. By signing the 20 year treaty of friendship, peace and cooperation in August 1971, with India, the Soviet Union gave almost a blank cheque to New Delhi and Soviet's good will for Pakistan had now evaporated. Further, Pakistan's role in arranging the Sino-American dialogue was greatly resented to Moscow.⁶²

The 1970s observed new era of cordial mutual ties between China and Pakistan when both countries agreed to build the first road; linking the two countries, an all-weather route, and three miles high through the Himalayas. It follows the trace of an ancient mule track, known as the "Silk Road" more than 1,000 years ago.⁶³ This new road is regarded as more political than military or economic significance of Pakistan, however, India showed concerns over its construction. Though, the road has no significant potential of being used as an invasion route. It runs from remote Kashgar to the Mintaka Pass, in Sikiang Province of China, 15,450 feet above the sea level; on the Pakistani side it runs 80 miles down to Gilgit in Pakistani held Kashmir. The road was ceremoniously inaugurated in February 1971 and referred to as the "Highway of Friendship."⁶⁴

On the other hand, when the trouble finally started in East Pakistan in March 1971, the Chinese press and government did not make any hasty comment. It neither supported Pakistan's military action nor attached itself to the Bengali movement in East Pakistan. Its main stance was against open interference in the internal matters of Pakistan by the Indian Government. China, like the United States, was very careful of not getting involved in the crisis. The Chinese did not relish the prospect of supporting a military regime of West Pakistan against the elected representatives of East Pakistan. China had always supported liberation movements all over the world and it could not suddenly give up that role for ruling elite of West Pakistan. At the same time, it could not see the prospect of a major

diplomatic triumph of the Soviet Union and Indian in South Asia where she had an important role to play. These diplomatic realities in South Asia, particularly Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area, put it into an awkward position. Under these circumstances, China stood with Pakistan but it was unhappy over the military atrocities in East Pakistan, when Bhutto visited Peking in November 1971 as Yahya's special emissary, China publically demanded that a "rational solution" should be found for East Bengal. The Chinese left Bhutto with no doubt that Pakistan should not expect any such help of intervention as China had promised and provided during the 1965 war. Pakistan got a "declaration of support" from Peking, but China made no specific commitments and assurances to Pakistan. When the war finally broke out as a result of Indian military intervention, China supported Pakistan in the Security Council but its support was confined to words and its real anger was expressed against Russia and India. China's role during the war revealed the bitter rivalry between the two communist giants in South Asia.⁶⁵ It was bitter over the success of Russian diplomatic gains in the area but not over the emergence of a new nation in the subcontinent. The United States still seemed to be interested in the maintenance of Pakistan's territorial integrity. Washington would not like to see a further dismemberment of Pakistan by the combined Soviet and Indian moves. But one thing was certain the heyday of U.S Pakistan relationships of the mid 1950s was over for good. The new relationship was likely to be merely pragmatic and based on geo-political and geo-strategic realities in South Asia. Besides, after the ouster of Mr. Bhutto by a military general, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, Pakistan once again was facing a difficult internal political crisis. The Carter administration's attitude has been quite cold to the extent of ignoring Pakistan. President Carter made a tour of Asia and Africa in the winter of 1978.⁶⁶ He visited India, and showed an interest in the new Government led by Morarji Desai (installed after the defeat of Indira Gandhi and Congress), but did not visit Pakistan.

On 27th December 1979, the Soviet attacked Afghanistan which turned the geo-strategic and geo-political importance of Pakistan, at that juncture, by keeping in view the ideological expansion of communism and fear of U.S about the access of Russia towards the Arabian Sea; the U.S administration developed a soft corner for Pakistan and tried to revive its relations with Pakistan. Under these changing geo-political environment, the then U.S President Carter ranged to Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to check probable Soviet expansion and aggression against Pakistan.⁶⁷ Two days later, the then U.S National Security Adviser, reaffirmed a 1959 bilateral agreement (SEATO & CENTO ended in 1972 and 1979 respectively) under which the United States would take appropriate action, including the use of force to protect Pakistan if it was attacked. The U.S Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, visited China (first visit of its kind since 1949) and discussed how the United States and China might work 'in parallel' to assist Pakistan. Islamabad's response to Washington was that of caution and restraint. When the US Deputy Secretary of that time visited Islamabad, he was told that Pakistan was not entirely happy with U.S public invocation of the 1959 bilateral agreement without advance consultation with Pakistani administration. Pakistan was not unmindful of the fact that this agreement could not be of any use to Pakistan to check Indian aggressions in 1965 and 1971 whereas, the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 put India in a position to intervene militarily and dismembered

Pakistan. Washington knew about the signing of such a treaty on 31st July (ten days before). Moreover, Warren Christopher said that the 1959 agreement covers aggression on Pakistan by the Soviet Union or by a country in the control of the Soviet Union (impliedly, he excluded India). During the Brzezinski visit of Islamabad, he concentrated much more on analyzing the nature of the problem that this region was confronted with, particularly the threat to Pakistan on the long term basis as if he had nothing to do with the immediate security of Pakistan. However, he laid stress that the US wanted to minimize the chance of conflict in the region between India and Pakistan to enhance the security of this region which was constantly threatened from its eastern border. In fact, policy of super powers towards South Asian region, have based on divergence and convergence of their geo-political and geo-strategic interests. All the political postures, treaties and interventions were modified by the regional, political and economic motives of super powers in the Sub-continent. It can also be analyzed that super powers made interventions and meddled into South Asian affairs for their own political designs while maintaining geo-strategic agendas and geo-political objectives in order to uphold their territorial diplomacy and to counter the super powers mutual regional interests and ideological expansions with the changing political realities.

Conclusion

India and Pakistan, after the independence of the Sub-continent in 1947, have experienced volatile, conflicting and hostile mutual relations. On the other hand, the geo-political and geo-strategic importance of Pakistan has necessitated the intervention of super powers for their political interests, ideological expansions and territorial hegemonic designs. In these circumstances, the geo-political and geo-strategic importance of the Sub-continent not only compelled to super powers to intervene in regional politics for their ideological objectives and political gains but also the mutual animosities of India and Pakistan were exploited in political, territorial and ideological context. The fear of survival, security syndrome and military disparities in the Sub-continent pushed Pakistani politicians and policy-makers to gain balance of power to counter territorial designs of India. However, Pakistani leadership wanted to project Pakistan's positive, soft and peaceful image at international level. On the other hand, the Soviet-American, the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-American rivalries; shaped the geo-political scenario, influenced on the foreign policy formulation and compelled the India and Pakistan to make their choices for political, ideological and security alliances in international politics.

The major goal of Pakistan's defense policy has, therefore, been the search for security, strategic deterrence and territorial integrity of the state. These security concerns practically indicated two factors; firstly, the augmentation of security of Pakistan against these threats; primarily from India and secondarily from Afghanistan because of U.S.S.R. designs of ideological expansion, territorial occupation and her dream to reach the warm water. Secondly, the offsetting of India's military superiority in South Asia by strengthening Pakistan's defense arrangements and, at times, by using diplomacy as a countervailing measure. However, the changing geo-political and geo-strategic conditions, brought many changes in super powers policies, thus, disheartened by the unfortunate event of the Sub-continent, particularly Indian wars with Pakistan and China; the United

States was convinced that there was no hope of building up India against China in Asian affairs. In the case of Pakistan, the special relations were formally broken when Pakistan gave notice to close the important U.S strategic communication Centre at Bedaber. Beside this, after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Soviet Russia reassessed “new trends” in Pakistan’s foreign policy. In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, China gave open and unequivocal support to Pakistan. China proved to be the principal arms supplier to Pakistan in the year 1965-70. Pakistan’s moved to the direction of the Soviet Union during President Ayub’s visit to Moscow in 1967 and Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan in early 1968, culminating in the Russian decision to give Pakistan some military supplies which raised suspicions in Peking.

Furthermore, Nixon’s soft corner and sympathetic policy towards the Sub-continent in 1971-72 raised many angry voices both inside and outside the United States. The world press had flashed atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and the Nixon administration was charged with siding with the military junta in Pakistan. After the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan was desperate to preserve her territorial integrity in the contest of separatist tendencies in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, which appeared to have the Soviet Union’s blessings. Pakistan looked towards Washington for protection from Russian designs and Indians involvement to threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity. In fact, it had already revived its interest in CENTO a reversal of Bhutto’s earlier demands of withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. On 27th December 1979, the Soviet attacked Afghanistan which turned the geo-strategic and geo-political importance of Pakistan, at that juncture, by keeping in view the ideological expansion of communism and fear of U.S about the access of Russia towards the Arabian Sea; the U.S administration developed a soft corner for Pakistan and tried to revive its relations with Pakistan. Finally, super powers intervened and meddled into South Asian affairs for their own political designs while maintaining geo-strategic agendas and geo-political objectives in order to uphold their territorial diplomacy and to counter their mutual regional interests and ideological expansions with the changing global political realities.

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